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I.

Introduction
A number of recent studies have investigated the implications of

increases in labor force participation rates of married women for the
distribution of earnings across families. 1

These studies typically compare

a summary inequality measure of the actual distribution of husband's plus

wife's earnings in some population of married-spouse-present households to
a similar summary measure of husband's earnings alone in the same population.
Virtually every study finds the sum of spouse's earnings more equally distributed than the husband's earnings alone. 2

This result has some intuitive

appeal if one views the husband as the "primary" earner of the family with
his earnings viewed as exogenous with respect to the wife's behavior
presumably exerting a negative income effect on her labor supply.

and

Then

husband's earnings and wife's labor supply would be negatively correlated
and as long as the covariance of husband's earnings and wife's wage rate
is not too strongly positive one would expect an equalizing effect of wife's
earnings.

That is, husbands with relatively high earnings would have wives

with relatively low earnings and vice versa.
The interaction between the labor supply decisions of married women
and the distribution of family earnings is a topic of considerable interest_
and policy-relevance but there are several problems wi~h the literature as
summarized above:
(1)

The assumption that the wife responds to her husband's character

istics, e.g. earnings, in making labor supply decisions but that the husband
does not respond to his wife's characteristics is an implicit untested

2

assumption in these studies.

The theory of family labor supply together

with the existing empirical evidence suggests that joint decision making,

with both spouses' labor supply responding to prices and other exogenous
parameters facing the family may be a more plausible hypothesis.
(2)

These studies in essence pose the question:

3

what would happen

to the distribution of family earnings if all working married women stopped
working and their husbands did not respond in any way to this drastic change?
This does not seem to be a very interesting counterfactual

both because

the assumed lack of a response by husbands is implausible and because of the
drastic all--or-nothing nature of the hypothetical experiment.
(3)

Even if the question were formulated more carefully it is not

clear that the results of these studies can be meaningfully interpreted.
Labor-leisure decisions are endogenous and are directly influenced by family
preferences.

Hence the distribution of actual family earnings is not

necessarily a good proxy for the distribution of economic welfare given
that earnings is a choice variable to a large extent.

A step in the

right direction in this regard would be to examine the distribution of
potential family earnings, i.e. the sum of spouse's wage rates.
(4)

Finally, al100st all of the studies of this topic use cross

sectional data and treat wage rates as exogenous.

A more appropriate

approach to studying the effects of married women's labor supply decisions
on the distribution of economic welfare would be to follow a cohort through
time and allow for feedback of labor supply decisions on wage rates.

This

is particularly important because the on-the-job training hypothesis
suggests that household decisions make wage rates as well as labor supply
endogenous.

3

This paper studies the interactions between married women's labor
supply decisions and the distribution of family earnings in a context in
A two

which the above shortcomings of the literature can be corrected.
period model of family labor supply with endogenous wage growth is

analyzed in order to derive predictions concerning the evolution of the

distribution of spouses' wage rates over time.

By making some simplifying

assumptions it is possible to obtain unambiguous predictions of the signs
However, unless

of cross-spouse wage effects, compensated and uncompensated.

the links between wage rates across periods are relatively weak, the signs
of own-wage effects are ambiguous.

These results are then used to derive

predictions about changes in intracohort inequality over time.

The

main prediction is increasing equality over time in the distribution of
the sum of the spouses wage rates.

The model is estimated with a sample of

young white, married-spouse -present women from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Young Women, a panel data set with wage and labor supply data for
women and their husbands.

The majority of estimated parameters of the model

are plausible and consistent with the theory.

These estimates include

negative uncompensated cross-spouse wage effects on labor supply, and for
women a positive effect of labor market experience on the
growth.

rate of wage

The predictions of the inequality analysis are confirmed in the

data.
Section II of the paper presents and analyzes the theoretical model
and discusses econometric methods for estimating the model.

The dat~ are

described in Section III and the empirical results presented and discussed.
Section IV presents the inequality analysis and Section V sununarizes the

4

study.

Appendix A contains details of the comparative statics and Appendix

B describes the method used to impute wage rates.

II.

Theoretical Analysis
This section presents a two period model of. the intertemporal labor

leisure choices of a husband-wife fa.mily t:ith perfect foresight in the context
of endogenous post-schooling human capital accumulation through on-the-job
.
4
training at work.
The analysis focuses on t,:o key issues: (1) the
characterization of the pattern of own and cross-spouse wage effects on labor
supply, both within and across periods; and (2) the implications of the
,model for empirical estimation of both labor supply functions and human
capital accumulation functions.

Section IV considers the implications of the

model for the evolution of the distribution of potential family earni~gs ov~r
time.
Suppose that family utility in each period

1

is a function of the

leisure time of the female (LF), the leisure time of the male(~), and

a composite purchased good (X):

(1)

To allow for the household's anticipated continuation beyond period 2 it is
assumed that the household receives utility from the stock of non-human assets
it carries forward to the beginning of period 3.

Hence h • h (A )

represents the utility of carrying forward assets of amunt
periods.

s

3

A to future
3

5

The househo ld's intertem poral budget constra int can be written as
(discoun ting to period 1 and assuming perfect capital markets ):

(2)

_!_ and r is the interes t rate, Hij • hours worked by the 1th
l+r
spouse (i c M,F) in the jth period, w1j • the market wage rate of the 1th spouse

where

R •

P • price of goods in period i, and A1 c initial assets.
1
Non-earn ed sources of income are ignored . The adding up constra ints on

in the jth period,

family time allocati on are

¾tj + 1\tj • T
LFj +

H,,j • T

j • 1,2.

(3)

j • 1,2

So far the model is a two-per iod version of the stanrl~~~ ~tatic
family labor supply model (e.g. Ashenfe lter and Heckman 1974). Since the
focus of this paper is on changes in the potenti al family earning s
distribu tion over time we must specify the process governin g wage growth.
The human capital model suggests as an account ing framework that the market
wage rate offered to an individu al equals the market rental rate per unit of
human capital multipli ed by the individ ual's stock of human capital .

Suppose

that by the beginnin g of period one both spouses have finished formal school
ing and bring to the market exogeno usly determin ed stocks of human capital .
For each spouse, the change in the human capital stock during period one
depends upon the rate of depreci ation of previou sly acquired human capital
and the amount accumul ated through on-the-j ob training during the period.

6

The amount accumu lated through on-the -job trainin g depends in turn on the
amount of time spent in market work during period 1 and on the ability
of the individ ual to learn from on-the -job experie nce.

This sugges ts the

followi ng specifi cation of wage growth for a represe ntative couple:

(4)

(5)

where

6 is a common deprec iation factor; yM

and

yF are individ ual-sp ecific

tion
ability measur es for learnin g on the job; f and g are human capita l produc
functio ns with positiv e and decrea sing margin al produc ts; and

Z is a cotmnon
6

capita l.
vector of exogenous factors affecti ng the rental rate per unit of human
The human capita l produc tion fllllctio ns specifi ed in (4) and (5) allow
own
for the possib ility that human capita l may be a produc tive input to its
produc tion by includi ng WMl

and WFl

as inputs in

f and

g.

The househ old is assumed to maximize the presen t discoun ted value of
utility ,

U(LFl'

x..a_,

Xl)

+ S•U(LF2' ~2' X2) + S2h(A3) where S • 1~ and

is the rate of time prefere nce, subjec t to the budget constr aint (2), the
time constr aints (3), and the human cap i tal produc tion functio ns (4 and 5).

P

Substi tuting (J), (4), and (5) into (2), the optimi zation problem can be
express ed in lagrang ean form as
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(6)

where

l is the lagrangea n multiplie r.

The necessary condition s for an

interior maximum of (6) are the following :

_ • LHi
!f_
"IU
U

-

l(H_ __ f

-~

2

R

+ WMl)

• 0

(7)

(8)

a.r

-

1M2

3

• S•U

1M2

- lW:

R • 0

(9)

M2

(10)

ac5:

-

aXi

• U

~

- AP

1

• 0

(11)

(12)

(13)
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(14)
where

Equat ions (7) and (8) imply that

LMl

and

LFl

are chose n so that

the margi nal utilit y of leisu re (in dolla rs, i.e. divid ed
by

A) equal s the

wage forego ne in period 1 plus the disco unted earni
ngs foreg one in perio d 2
;f

by sacri facin g the human capit al that would have been accum
ulated had the last
unit of leisu re been alloc ated to work inste ad. These disco
unted foreg one
earni ngs in p£rio d 2 are repre sente d by the terms
t
2 2 R > 0 and ~ 2 g2 R > 0

J\r

in (7) and (8) respe ctive ly.

Hence the optim al value s for

~

and

171

are lower than they would be in a model that omitt ed the
human capit al
produ ction funct ions. The inter preta tion of the other first
order condi tions
is straig htforw ard and stand ard.
In order to deriv e testa ble hypot heses from the model it
is neces sary
to impos e furth er struc ture on it. We have chose n to impos
e stron g contem poran eous
•epar abilit y on the utili ty funct ion, in addit ion to the
intert empo ral
•epar abilit y alread y assum ed, imply ing that all cross -part
ial deriv ative s of
the utili ty funct ion are zero. Under this assum ption, and
settin g P • 1 with
1
~ as nume raire, the comp arativ e static s of
the model are deriv ed in Appen dix
A.

The analy sis is focus ed on the utility -com pensa ted effec
ts of chang es in
WMl. and WFl on leisu re in both perio ds of both spous es.
Defin ing Das the

9

determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix and

Dij

as the minor of the

ijth element of the matrix, the second order conditions for a maximum require

D

<

0

and

D > O, i • 1, ••• , 8 (see Appendix A).
11

From the results in

Appendix A the following comparative static derivatives can be presented:

dLF2

•
-1dWFl u

10
Each minor that can be signed either a priori from the second order
conditions or by examination (see Appendix A) has its sign indicated above

as do the derivatives themselves when they can be unambiguously signed.
Several interesting patterns appear.
effects has two terms.

Each of these utility-compensated wage

One is the pure substitution effect from a classical

model in which period 2 wages are exogenous, and the other is a cross-period
effect arising from the fact that a change in the period one wage causes the
period two wage to change also.

d¾u/dWMl}u

Consider

as an example.

The

A(l + ~ f 23 ) D /n is the own-period substitution effect, which
11
is negative as usual. The second term, lR(l - ~+ f 3)n13/D should be equal
to aL ,·awM2 lu. aw ,awMl. That is, it is the effect of a change in WM2
.
M2
7il
of the variation in WM2) multiplied bysource
the
of
(regardless
on
first term

1xJ.

the size of the change in WM 2 caused by the original increase in WMl.

Both

of these terms could be expected to be positive, although this cannot be shown
unambiguously, so the complete effect of a compensated increase in WMl

¾ti

is ambiguous.

Intuitively, a rise in

WMl

on

makes leisure in period one

to
2
rise and this makes leisure in period 1 cheaper relative to leisure in period
more expensive so less is "bought".

But a rise in WMl

2, so more is "bought" on this account.

causes

wM

The net effect is uncertain, but the

smaller the on-the-job training effect, the more likely it is that the net .
effect will be negative, as in the classical model.
It is interesting to note that this ambiguity arises only for the own
vage effects, both within and across periods, but not for the cross-spouse

vage effects, which are all unambiguously positive.

In a model with additively

aeparable preferences the compensated cross-spouse substitution effects are all
positive, both within and across periods.

In each of the 4 cross-spouse de-
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rivatives one of the terms represents a within period cross-spous e effect and
the other a cross-perio d cross-spous e effect, and both terms are positive,
leading to unambiguous predictions in each case.
For purposes of estimation the analysis suggests that the labor supply
of each spouse in each period is a function of both spouses' initial wage
rates, initial assets, the vector

Z of exogenous determinant s of the period

two market rental rate on human capital, and both spouses ability factors,

(15)

The following signs of the partial derivatives of equations (15) are pre
dicted by the abo~e analysis:

a~j/ awr1 1 ~

<

O and

Other predictions of the analysis are presented in Appendix A.
The complete model to be estimated consists of the four labor supply
equations (15) and the two wage growth equations (4 and 5).

In the next

section the empirical specificati on of the model is discussed.

The remainder

of this section deals with the stochastic specificatio n and its implication s
for estimation of the model.
Let us transform (4) and (5) into percentage wage growth equations
and include random disturbance s with zero mean and constant variance:

(4')

(5')

12
~

where

turbances.
ym and

and GF are wage growth rate~ and

are the dis-

and

The latter represent omitted factors that perhaps belong in

Yt and are unobserved but known to the individual.

duals are aware of th! realized values of
supply decisions these decisions
that

EK

~

and

HFl

EM

EF

and

will depend on

~

and

Z or

Given that the indivi-

when making their labor

EF.

This implies

EM and £F' so Ordinary Least Square

are correlated with

(OLS) estimates of the parameters of (4') and (5') would be biased.

However,

OLS can provide consistent estimates of (15) and the results used as first
~

stage estimators for
tion of (4 ') and (5 ').

7

and HFl
If

in Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estima

£M and £F

were correlated then the asymptotic

efficiency of 2SLS estimates could be improved upon by joint estimation of
(4'), (5') and (15) with Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS).

Ill.

Empirical Analysis
The empirical work was carried out with data from the National

Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Young Women
1968 through 1975.

8

using the panel observations from

Using this data we have constructed Periods One and Two

wage rates as follows.

Period One is defined as 1968-71 and the Period One

wage for an individual is the average of all the full-time wages observed
between 1968 and 1971, after deflating them all to a 1967 base.

The maximum

number of wage observations that could go into constructing what we call for
abort "wage one" for each individual is four, the minimum is one and the average
is 2.7.

13

The main reason for taking a period as long as this and constru cting an average
wage over the period is to get as accurate as possible a measure of the wage,
free of transito ry influenc es that could affect any single wage observa tion.
Period Two is then defined as 1973-1975 and "wage two" is construc ted in an
analogou s manner with a maximum of two possible observa tion points. 9
For women, wage rates were observed direct~y , but men's wage rates had
to be calculat ed by dividing annual earnings by annual hours, thus introdu cing
a potentia l source of measurement error.

In order to have an observed wage

rate an individu al must have worked at least part of the period.

Hence using

actual wage rates in the analysis would force the exclusio n of non-wor kers,
thus truncati ng the observed range of work behavio r.

To avoid truncati ng

the sample in this manner it is desirab le to estimate wages for non-wor kers.
Thus we have created predicte d market wage measure s for both spouses in both
periods using wage regressi on estimate s on the samples reportin g wages in
each period.

The wage regressi ons include a variable construc ted to correct

for the potenti al selectiv ity bias that arises when using a non-random
sample such as workers .

The techniqu e used to correct for selectiv ity bias

is due to Olsen (1980) and the results are reported in Appendix B.

Using the

results from Table B-2, wage one measure s have been construc ted for each
spouse correspo nding to mid 1969 and wage two measure s for the beginnin g of
1
1974.
From these measure s we then constru ct a predicte d annual average

°

percenta ge wage growth rate for each spouse from mid 1969 to the beginnin g
of 1974.

Table 1 present s sample means and standard deviatio ns for these

and other variable s used in the analysi s.

The table shows that men had higher

wages than women in both periods but that women's wages grew slightly more
rapidly , so that as a percenta ge of the average man's wage the average

14
woman's wage rose from 63.8% to 64.9%.
Work exper ience meas ures were const ructe d by addin g
up weeks worked
durin g each perio d and divid ing by the total number
of weeks in the perio d,
yield ing the perce nt of perio d worked meas ures shown
in Table 1. These
meas ures corre spond to the H j in the theo retic al
model excep t for being
1
meas ured in perce ntage terms rathe r than as abso lutes
. The reaso n for this
chang e is that some indiv idual s in the sample were
still in schoo l for part
of perio d one and are there fore consi dered not "elig
ible" for labor force
parti cipa tion for that part of the perio d, given that
schoo ling 'deci sions
are taken as prede termi ned here. Also , some of the
coup les did not marry
unti l after the begin ning of perio d one and there ~s
no infor matio n avail able
for men until they marry a woman in the samp le. Table
l shows that most
of the men worked full time in both perio ds while the
parti cipa tion rate was
not only much lower for women but fell by almo st 10
perce ntage poin ts from
perio d one to two., The avera ge woman in the samp le
was 22 years
old in mid 1969 and abou t 27 years old at the begin
ning of 1974 so the
decli ne in the labor force parti cipa tion rate is coinc
ident with
the onse t of the prime child -bear ing years .
The other varia bles shown in Table 1 inclu de educ ation
leve ls for each
spou se, dummy varia bles for south ern resid ence and
resid ence in an SMSA,
and the local unemployment rate. Educ ation and age
(year born} are inten ded
to repre sent the abili ty facto rs yM and Yp• which
cann ot be direc tly
obser ved. These sorts of prox ies for unob serva bles
have been used in previ ous
human capi tal produ ction funct ion estim ation (Laze
ar 1976 and Heckman 1975 ).

15
The family characteristics represent elements of the vector

Z,

variables

that exogenously affect the rental rate of human capital.
Another variable that belongs in the analysis according to the theory is

A1 , the initial assets of the family.

Including A in the labor supply
1
equations would permit estimation of wealth effects and calculation of compensated

wage effects.

However, the asset data available in the NLS are not' considered

to be of higher quality than most other asset data collected directly from
respondents and therefore probably include

large errors.

Furthermore, serious

questions have been ~aised regarding the possibility of spurious correlation
arising between assets and labor supply due to the possible dependence of both
11
on tastes.
Thus although in the theoretical model A is exogenous, in
1
practice it would be very difficult to construct an ~xogenous asset measure
from the available data.

Thus we choose to omit assets although this will

rule ~ut the computation of compensated wage effects. 12
The samples available for estimating the model consist of 909 white
married couples for whom wages could be estimated for both periods and both
spouses and with complete information available on all other variables.

Of

the 3,663 white women aged 14-24 in 1968 included in the survey originally,
the majority of the exclusions here were due to not being married and
.
13
attrition from the panel.
Table 2 presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of the parameters of the wage
growth equations for wives and husbands.

The coefficient estimate for wives

on "Percent of Period One Worked" is positive and significant in both cases
vith a substantially larger point estimate generated by 2SLS than OLS.

The

larger estimate in the 2SLS case suggests that the correlation between the

16

disturbance in the wage growth equation and the experience variable causes
a downward bias in conventional OLS estimates of the effect of experience on
wage growth.

For husbands the results show a negative effect of experience

on wage growth, significant in the 2SLS case.

This unexpected result

suggests that the wage growth rate of young white married men is negatively
affected, other things constant, by work experience and presumably on-the-job
training, but it is difficult to imagine the sort of behavior that could
lead to this result.

Thus, in the case of husbands the experience variable

may not be highly enough correlated with the amount of training received
on the job to serve as a good proxy for it.
The results in Table 2 also indicate large negative and significant
coefficient estimates on the period one wage, suggesting that the initial
human capital stock as represented by the wage has a negative effect on the
rate of production of further human capital.

In fact the coefficient

estimates are implausibly large, with implied elasticities at the means of
about -10 for wives and -4 for husbands.

This type of result has been

encountered in other studies and suggests a spurious association between the
rate of wage growth and the initial wage.

The two are definitionally related,

of course, but this by itself is unlikely to accowt for such large negative
coefficients.

Heckman (1975) suggests that some variable omitted from the

wage growth equation may be correlated with both the initial wage and the

rage of wage growth and its omission would thus lead to biased estimates of
14
the initial wage coefficient.
Education is included in the wage growth equations as a proxy for
learning ability on the job, and its coefficient estimates are positive and

17
significant.

Even if education was uncorrelated with learning ability on

the job, human capital theory would still predict a positive education coef15
ficieot,
so it is reassuring to see it appear here. The implied education
elasticities at the means are a relatively large 7.7 for women and 1.6 for
men.

The rate of wage growth rises fairly rapidly with age for wives
and rises with age but at a slower pace for husbands.

Human capital theory

predicts an eventually declining rate of wage growth with age, but this is
consistent with an initially rising segment.

Given average ages of 22 and

25 years for wives and husbands in 1969, a rising rate of wage growth with
age is plausible.
Residence in the South depresses wage growth and residence in an
SMSA raises it.

The unemployment rate has a perverse positive arid

significant, chough small, effect on wives' wage growth and insignificant
effects for husbands.
It is interesting to note that almost no coefficient estimates
change much between OLS and 2S1S with the exception of the coefficients on
the experience variable, already noted above. 16 This suggests that previous
OLS estimates of wage growth equations containing an experience variable are
not seriously biased except for the experience coefficient itself.

Lazear's

(1976) estimate of a positive significant effect of experience on wage
growth for young men from the NLS Young Men Survey may therefore be question
able in light of our results.

18
Table 3 presents OLS estimates of the equations explaining the
percent of each period worked. 17

The own wage effects are not significantly

differently from zero except for the husband's in period two while the
cross-spouse wage effects are all negative and significant.

This pattern

makes sense in view of the theory, which predicted negative compensated

cross effects and, if the experience effect on wage growth is relatively
small, positive own wage effects.

The estimates reported in Table 3 are,

however, uncompensated effects; if income effects on labor supply are
negative, then the negative cross wage effects would be reinforced and the
positive own wage effects would be offset.

Thus the insignificant own wage

estimates could represent offsetting income and substitution effects and
the negative significant cross wage estimates represent the sum of negative
income and substitution effects.
The uncompensated cross-spouse wage elasticities of labor supply are
larger for the wife than for the husband, which is consistent with the notion
that married women's labor supply is relatively elastic compared to married

men.

18

However, all of the cross-spouse wage elasticities are larger than

one in absolute value, contradicting the view that married men respond very
inelastically to relative prices in making labor supply decisions.

Notice also

that the elasticities decline over time but there is still a relatively
large labor supply responsein period two to the period one spouse's wage.
The only significant own wage elasticity, for the husband in period two, is
a relatively small .50.

This figure contains the income effect as well as

the substitution effect, however, so the compensated own-wage elasticity
is no doubt larger.

19

The cross-spouse education effects on labor supply are all postive and
significant with elasticities close to or greater than one.

Of the own

education effects only the wife's in period one is positive and significant,
while the husband's in period two is actually negative and significant.
These results make our interpretation of education as a proxy for learning
-ability on the job questionable for the following reason.

The model predicts

negative compensated cross-spouse ability effects on labor supply as long as
the effect of ability on the marginal product of experience in the wage growth
equation is positive (see Appendix A) and positive compensated own ability
effects on labor supply if the effect of experience on wage growth is small
as well.

The results presented in Table 3 are uncompensated effects and

increases in ability have income effects on labor supply as well, presumably
negative if leisure is a normal good.

Hence the uncompensated cross-spouse

education effects should consist of the sum of negative income and substitu
tion--effects, yet empirically they are all positive and significant.

The

uncompensated own education effects should consist of offsetting negative
income and positive substitution effects, yet only two are insignificant
and of the two statistically significant effects
other negative.

one is positive and the

This suggests that some factor not explicitly considered in

the model, such as assortative mating by education and correlation between education and tastes for work, may be behind these results.
In this model year born (or age) of the wife and husband were also
intended to represent learning ability with the hypothesis being that given
the relative youth of the sample learning ability may increase with age
possibly at a declining rate.

Under this interpretation one would expect

negative wicompensated cross-spouse age effects on labor supply and uncertain

20

own age effects due again to offsetting income and substitution effects.
The empirical results are, however, similar to those for education with the
quadratic cross-spouse age effects all positive when evaluated at the means
and the own effects predominately negative.

These results suggest that age

is playing a role other than that hypothesized here, possibly again
involving assortative mating and tastes for work.
The remaining coefficient estimates in Table 3 indicate that
residence in the South reduces labor supply and residence in an SMSA raises
labor supply of both spouses, with statistically significant estimates only
for the first period.

Increases in the local unemployment .rate depress

labor supply of married women but the estimates fo: men are small and in
significant.

In terms of the theoretical model these results suggest a

relatively higher rental rate on human capital in SMSAs and areas with low
unemployment and a relatively low rental rate in the South.

IV.

Inequality Analysis
The empirical results presented above have some interesting implica

tions for the evolution of the distribution of potential family earnings of
a given cohort over time.

To develop these implications note that the

variance of the sum of tµe spouses wage rates in period i can be written as

2
Dividing both sides by (WMi
+ WFi)
and multiplying the first term on the
-2 -2
~ -2
RHS by WMi/WMi' the second by
Fi/WFi and the third by WMiWF /WMiWFi
1
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yields an expression for the square of the coefficient of variation of the sum
of the spouses wage rates:

where

ai

=wM1/(WMi + WFi)

Now, assuming that

ai

and

pi

is the correlation coefficient of

WMi and wFi'

changes negligibly from periods one to two the

difference in the squared coefficient of varia~ion of the wage sum between·
periods two and one is

2
2
2
2
cv2(wM2 + WF 2) - CV (WM1 + WFl) • a [CV (WM2) - cv (WM1)]

Inspection of this expression reveals that if the separate distributions
of the husband's and wife's wage rates become more equal over time (i.e.

if the expressions in the first two brackets are negative) then as long as
p

2

and

pl

are positive the distribution of the sum of the wage rates will

1110ve toward equality as well unless

p

2

>

p
1

by a large enough amount.

The results in Table 2 suggest that increasing equality in.the separate
distributions is a likely consequence of the large negative impact of the
initial wage on subsequent growth.

This is also consistent with Mincer's

(1974) analysis in which during the stage prior to "overtaking" the earnings
of high investors in human capital catch up to the initially higher earnings
of low in_vestors.

Since overtaking is calculated to occur 7-9 years after
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leaving school, the majority of this sample fit into the pre-overtak ing
category.

The empirical results are less clear on the likely direction of

change of the correlation coefficient .

A husband with a relatively high

period one wage can expect slow growth in his own wage and, via the negative
effect of his wage on his wife's labor 'supply and the resulting labor supply
effect on her wage growth, slow growth in her wage.

On the other hand a

wife with a relatively high wage in period one will experience relatively
slow wage growth but her husband is likely to have relatively faster wage
growth since her wage has a negative effect on his labor supply, which in
turn has a positive effect on his wage growth (that is,

acM/~Ln
t

•

aL_ __ 1 ,.,

7U anFl

>

0 since both terms are negative).

This would tend

if anything to reduce the correlation between spouse's wage rates over time,

a prediction of Smith's (1979) analysis as well.
Thus on balance the most likely direction of change in both the separate
wage rate distributio ns an~ in the distributio n of the sum is toward equality,

with the correlation coefficient declining also.

Table 4 presents data

for the sample that confirm all of these predictions .

The coefficient s of

variation for all three distribution s fell from periods one to two with the
relative decline for the sum (19%) bracketed by the declines for the husband's
(14%) and the wife's (21%) wage rates.. The very high correlation between the
wage rates, caus_ed at least in part by high correlation s between spouses

education levels (.53) and ages (.76), remained high in period two but did
decline somewhat.

As expected the distributio n of husbands' labor supply

in both periods is much more equal than that of wives, while the correlation
between spouses' labor supply is close to zero.
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V.

Summary
This paper has attempted to quantify the role of married women's labor

supply behavior as a determinant of the distribution of potential family
earnings.

The framework of the study was designed to correct some of the

ahortcomingsof previous work in this area.

The theoretical fratiework

proposed is a two period model of family labor supply with endogenous
human capital growth.

Analysis of the model leads to a number of comparative

static predictions concerning the effects of an individual's initial wage
rate and on-the-job learning ability on his or her labor supply and on the

labor supply of his or her spouse.

These predictions are tested by

estimating the parameters of the model using repeated observations on a
sample of your.g, white, married, spouse-present couples.

The majority

of the empirical results are consistent with the model's predictions,
including negative uncompensated cross-spouse wage effects on labor
supply both within and across periods, and positive age, education, and
(for wives) experience coefficients in the wage growth equations.

Some

of the results that do not conform to expectations include a negative
effect of husband's experience on the rate of wage growth, negative effects
for both spouses of initial wage rates on the rate of wage growth, and
generally positive cross-spouse age and education effects on labor supply.
Giveu these results, it was possible to derive predicti?ns about
changes over time in the degree of inequality in the distributions of
husband's, wife's and the sum of spouse's wage rates.

All three distribu

tions were predicted to become more equal over time and these predictions
are confirmed in the sample used for the study.

These tendencies may in

part be due to the particular age group used, namely quite young couples,
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and a future study will test these predictions on other cohorts as well.

The main implication of these findings is that married women's labor supply
decisions clearly do have an effect on the potential faraily earnings
distribution but assesment of the nature and magnitude of the effect must
take into account the en<logeneity of those decisions.
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Appen dix A

in the
Total diffe renti ation of the first order condi tions given
al equat ion:
text (equa tions 7-14) yield s the follow ing matri x diffe renti

J

0

0

0

C

0

e

0

0

0

i

j

0

0

0

0

9.

~

0

l;.

0

d

0

d1'M1

A([l+I D\t2f2 3ldWM l + Rl\t2f l2dyM }

dLFl.

y([l+R HF2g2 3]dWF l + RHF2g l2dyF}

¾2
e

0

m

0

0

0

n

0

0

0

q

0

0

-1

0

0

0

0

s

0

-RP 2

0

0

0

0

0

s2h"

-R2

i

1

n

-1 -RP 2 -R2

where

b • RH 2 > 0

c • - ~ £2 - WMl < 0

j • SU~ ~

< 0

dLF2
dXl
dX2

dA3

0

d:\

IU{[l -o + f3 ]dWMl + dZ + fldyM }

= IU([l -6 + 83 ]dWFl + dZ + gldyF )
0

_1UdP2
0

y
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R. • -RWM2 <

0

m • SUL L
< 0
F2 F2

n • - RWF < 0
2
q

C

ux

X < 0
1 1

s = ·SUX X < 0

2 2

Recall from the text that

x1 is taken as the numerai re and P
1

= 1, and

·that all cross partial derivati ves of the utility function are assumed to
equal zero.
The second order conditio ns for a maximum require that the princip al
minors of the Hessian determi nant, bordereJ by a row and column of first
partial derivati ves of the combined constra int, alterna te in sign starting
-with plus.

Thus this requires that

a

O

C

o

d

1

C

i

0

where
and

Dii

> 0,

a

o

b

C:

0

d

o

1

b

0

j

C

i

R.

<

0, ••••

Dii > O, D < O,

0

is the minor of the ith diagona l element of the matrix above,

D is the determin ant of the matrix itself.

Evaluat ion of these

determin ants reveals that sufficie nt conditio ns for a maximum amount to
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nothing more than the following two requirements:
and

dm

>

e

2

aj > b 2 • Given the separability assumption it is not surprising

that the first condition involves only terms relating to the husband
and the second condition only terms relating to the wife.

These two

conditions simply require that the intertemporal time allocation problem
of each spouse not have a corner solution, i.e. that in

C1if1 -

¾iz)

LFl - LFZ

space the nonlinear budget.constraint is less convex than

the indifference curves, holding prices, assets etc. fixed.

The nonlinearity

in the budget constraint arises from the human capital production functions.
It will be assumed that

and

dm > e

2

and

2

aj > b, implying Dii > 0, i = 1, ••• , 8

D < 0.
Even without making these assumptions it is easily ascertained that

several other minors that will be of interest can be signed:

2
D -= (bR. - cj) qss h" (mi - en) > O
21

2
41 = (bR.
· - cj) qsS h"(dn - ei) > 0

D

2
D -= (en - im) qsS h"(aR. - be)> 0
32
2

D -= (dn - ei) qsS h"(bc - a.t) > O
43
Two other minors of interest that cannot be signed even making use of
the above assumptions are:
2 2
2
2
D • b(q[sR4 + P~R S h"] + sS h") (dm - e )
31
+ bqsS 2h"((im - en)i - (ie-dn)n) + qsS 2h"cR.(dm - e 2 ).
2
2
4
2
D • e(q[sR + P~R2S h"] + sS h") (aj - b )
42

+ eqsS 2h"((a1 - be) 1+ (jc - b.t)c) + nqsiS 2h"(aj - b 2).
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In both cases the first two terms are positive and the third is
negative.
Using these results and applying Cramers rule to solve for the
comparative static derivatives, we find the compensated wage effects

on leisure presen·ted in the text.

It is easy to see also by examining

the right side of the matrix equation above that if
positive then

dL

F1

/

I ,

ayM u

dL 2/

F

I,

dyM u

dL

M1

/d

yl"lu

f

12

and g
12

, and dL.-r/d
~

are

YFlu

are all positive and the other compensated leisure effects of changes
in

yM

and

yF

cannot be signed.

leisure effects of changes in

Finally, none of the compensated

Z can be signed.
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Appendix B

The wage measures described in the text were regressed on a set
of characteristics for each spouse in each period in order to impute wage
rates to the whole sample, including workers and nonworkers.

These

regressions are corrected for possible selectivity bias arising from the use
of a non-random sample (workers) by a method developed by Olsen (1980).

This involves first estimating linear models of the probability of observing
a wage for each spouse and period.

These regressions are reported in

Table B-1 with the explanatory variables including education, year born,
various higher order powers and interactions, and for women a measure of
the socioeconomic status of the household in which they were raised.

A

selectivity correction term is co~puted for each observation from each of
these regressions as
variable.

P-1, where

P is the fitted value of the dependent

These terms are then entered in the wage regressions, which are

reported in Table B-2 both with and without the selectivity correction term.
Given the statistical significance of the selectivity correction term in
three out of four cases at the 5% significance level, we use the regressions
including it to inpute wages.
Note that the samples used in Tables B-1 and B-2 include nonwhites
and also include any observation for which data were available on the
variables used in those regressions, regardless of whether the observation

is part of the subsample used in the regressions reported in the text.
This was done in order to use the maximum amount of information available
in constructing wage rates.
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Footnotes
1

See Danziger (1980, Lehrer and Nerlove (1980), Smith (1980) and

Thurow (1976) for studies using U.S. data and Gronau (1981) for a study
of Israeli data.
2
3

Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974) and Kniesner (1976) report small,

but positive statistically significant uncompensated effects of the wife's
wage rate on the husband's labor supply among married U.S. couples.

Rosen

zweig (1980) reports marginally significant effects using Indian data.

4A11 of the issues
of interest, particularly the distributional issues
can be handled in a two period framework with no loss of generality, thus
obviating the need for a less tractable full life"cycle model.

For examples

of the latter see Blinder and Weiss (1976), Ghez and Becker (1975), Heckman
(1975) and Smith (1977).

All except Smith consider only one-person house

holds.
51t might be considered reasonable in
this context to allow the household
to receive utility from the stocks of human as well as physical capital
carried forward but this complicates the analysis considerably.
6Equations (4) and
(5) are approximations derived from the fact that
for individual i,

w12

• e2K12 • (8 1 + A0)(Kil + AKi)

~

e1Kil + e1 AK1

+ KiiAe + A0AKi = wil + el{f(.) - 6K11> + Kilz • wil(l - 6) + elf(.)
...,. JC

1

iz, where ej • rental rate on human capital in period

j

=

{j • 1,2),

ICij • person i's human capital stock in period j, and AK
f(.) - 6Kil'
1
A8
z, and the term A0AK is ignored as a second order term. The equations

=
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in the text ace derived by normalizing e1 •Kil• l.

In the empirical work

the unobserved e1 and Kil will vary across individuals and their effects
will be captured by the estimated coefficients on observable variables.
This specification of the wage growth process differs from that of,

e.g., Ben-Porath (1970), Heclanan (1975), and Blinder and Weiss (1976)
who assume that Hij is divided in a way chosen b~ the individual into
mutually exclusive components of work ttbne and learning time with only
the latter contributing to human capital formation.

It differs also from

Rosen's (1977) formulation in which firms determine the learning potential
of jobs and workers choose the job with the optimal combination of current
and future earnings.

Both of these specifications involve key unobservahle

variables, as does mine.
7This abstracts from other possible reasons why OLS could be biased,
e.g. truncation of the dependent variables, discussed in Section III.
8

The NLS data are described in Center for Human Resource Research

(1976)and in a variety of other volumes published by the Center.
9No survey was taken in 1974.

Also, no direct data on women's wage

rates were collected in 1972, so this year is ignored as well.

10 Wage rates were constructed at the same dates for the whole
sample in order to eliminate the length of the period as a variable.

The

particular dates chosen correspond roughly to the average dates of ob
servation of actual wages one and two.

For example, the "date of observa-
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tion" of wage one for an individual for whom wage one was constructed
as the average of 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971 wage observations would
be mid 1969 (69.5).
11
see Smith (1980) for a full discussion of this issue.
12
other researchers have chosen this strategy as well for similar
reasons.

See, e.g. Kniesner (1976).

In some regressions not reported

here that included assets the coefficient on assets was never significant
at the 5% level and none of the other coefficients changed much.

13
By 1975 attrition from the panel had reached 17.8% of the
original observations.

Attrition bias is ignored here.

See Griliches,

Hall and Hausman (1978) for a discussion of this issue.
14Heckman
(1975, p. 254) suggests market inputs into postschool
investment as a candidate for an omitted variable correlated with both
the wage rate and the wage growth rate.
15Eamings
profiles are predicted to be steeper for more highly
educated individuals with a given amount of work experience because if the
present value of their lifetime earnings is to be equated with those of
less educated individuals then their earnings will have to grow faster in
order to make up for starting later •
.. · · ·--- --·- .. 16
The model was estimated with 3SLS as well, with the result that

almost all coefficients in the wage growth equations were virtually un
changed from the 2SLS estimates.

The exception was the coefficient on

Percent of Period One Worked for the husband, which almost doubled in
absolute value and remained negative.
17Ordinarily there is a large concentration of observat!ons of
married women's labor supply at the lower bound of zero, causing a well
known bias in OLS coefficient estimates.

In the present data set the youth

of the sample and the 3-4 year period length results in only 12% of the
women with zero percent of the first period worked, and 24% with zero
percent of the second period worked.

The labor supply equations for

females were .reestimated with Tobit to see if even this relatively small
concentration of observations at zero mattered, but no substantial changes
in coefficient estimates resulted.
18
See Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974) for results of this type.

Their

results for all age groups combined indicate that husband's and wife's
leisure times are complements while the present results for young couples
suggest that they are substitutes.
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Gene rating Inequ ality.

Princ eton

Table 1
Sample Cl1aracteristicsa
(Means and Standard Deviations)

b

Predicted Wage Growth
(Annual Average Percent)
Predicted First Period Wage
($/hour, real)

C

Predicted Second Period Wage
($/hour, real)

Husbands

Hives

Individual Characteristics

C

d

(1.56)

4.21

4.70

(2.76)

1.85

(.44)

2.90

( .63)

2.26

(.42)

3.48

(.65)

52.l

(37.8)

90.7

(18.7)

42.7

(37.1)

92.8

(14.2)

Years of Education in Period One

11.5

(1.9)

12.2

(2.4)

Year Born (19--)

47.1

(3.2)

44.8

(4.5)

Percent of Period One Worked

Percent of Period Two llorked

d

Family Characteristicse
Local Unemploycent Rate

(1.6)

4.7

Dummy= 1

if lives in South

.34

(.47)

Dummy= 1

if lives in SHSA

.55

(.47)

Sample size

Notes:

909

a

The sample consists of white married couples from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Young Women with complete information on all
variables used in the analysis.

b

Predicted Wage Growth is calculated ns (lnH 2 - lnW1 )/4.5, wh'?re
w2 and u1 are predicted second and first period wages, and 4.5 is
tfie number of ye.irs over which r,rowth is measured (mid 1969 to early

1974).
cSee Appendix B for details of the wage prediction procedure.
(Continued next page)

d
The Percen t of Period One Worked equals the total number of weeks
of work from 1968 through 1971 divided by the number of weeks in
the period (and multip lied by 100). School ing periods are exclude d
from the period as are periods for men before they married a woman
in the sample and began reporti ng inform ation. The Percen t of
Period Two Worked is defined simila rly for 1972-19 75, except that
no inform ation was availab le for 1974 since there was no survey that
year.

e

The family charac teristic s all apply to period one and are averag es
from 1968-19 71. For exampl e if a couple lived in the South for
two of the four years then the Southe rn variab le equals .so.

Table

2

Ordinary and Two Stage Least Squares Wage Growth Results

Wives

Husbands

OLS

2SLS

68

(9.6)

82

(6.6)

Percent of Period
One Worked

.01

(8.1)

.07

(7.9) . -.001

Period One Wage

(14.0)
-2-6
(-10.2)

(. 78)
(7.8)
-25
(-9.8)

Education

3.2
(7.8)

(14.3)

2.7
(6.6)

Year Born

-1.1

(8.6)

-1.4
(-14.U)

(-11.u)

2SLS

OLS

Intercept

( .11)

a

(7.0)

32

(37.0)

36

(18.4)

(O. 7)

-.06

(3.5)

1 c-,02)

(-1.3)
(18.8)
-5.2
(-3.6)

-5.3
(-3.6)

(30.8)

.53
(1.5)

(20.0)

.55
(1.6)

(12.8)

(28.3)

-.42
(-4.~)

(17.9)

(6.1) - -.42

1(-4.>)

D - Sout~

-6.4

(13.4)

-6.4

(7. 7)

-1.6

(15.9)

-1.s

(9.6)

D - SMSA

s.o

(12.5)

4.8

(6.8)

1.5

(13.7)

1.4

(8.0)

(0.4)

-.01

(0.4)

Unemployment Rate

.05

2
R (F)

.76

Notes:

(1. 7)
(403)

~18

(3.4)

.01
.70

(296)

8the only endogenous explanatory variable is Percent of Period One Worked.
The first stage regressions for this variable are given in Table 3.
T-statistics are in parentheses next to the coefficients and elasticities
calculAted at the means are in parentheses beneath the coefficients.

Table

3

Linear Regression Results for Percent of Period Worked

Period

Period One

I

Wives
Intercept

1,104

(2.9)

Husbands

I

Wives

Husbands

-234

(0.6)

576

(3.6)

(3.4)
-91
(-1.9)

-10.5
(-.45)

(0.2)

-55
(-1.1)

(2. 7)

9.0 (1.0)
(.29)

-34
(-2.3)

(2.0)

16
(0.50)

(2.5)

(3.1)

5.0
(1.3)

(0.8)

7.7
(.95)

(3.1)

4.5
(1.3)

(1.9)

-1.9
(-.25)

(2. 2)

(O. 7)

-13.3
(-2.0)

(2.3)

(0.8)

.10

(1. 7)

(0.3)
2.4
(-1.3)

-5.3
(.92)

(2.0)

(0.5)

.08

(2.2)

824

(3.9)

Wife's Period One Wage' -53
(-1.9)

(1.1)

Husband's Period
One Wage

-54
(-3.0)

(3.4)

Wife's Education

12.3
(2.7)

(2.1)

Husband's Education

7.7
(1.8)

(3.6)

-.64 (0.5)
(-.09)

Wife's Year Born

-47
(-.76)

(3.4)

-22 (2.8)
(-3.6)

Wife's Year Born
Squared

.49

(3.7)

.16 (2.1)

Husband's Year Born

6.8
(-1.9)

(1.0)

Husband's Year Born
Squared

-.10

(1.2)

1

1\10

10.2
(1.3)

-2.2
(.24)

(0.6)

.03 (O. 7)

10.9
(.60)
-.11

-.04

D - South

-34

(2.4)

-19

(2.4)

-11.6

(0.7)

-5.1

(0.9)

D - SMSA

41

(3.1)

14.0

(1.9)

18

(1.3)

2.7

(0.5)

-2.1

(3.0)

-1.6

(2.1)

-.13

(o.4)

Unemployment Rate

.26

1? (F)

Note:

(28.5)

-.40 (1.0)
.03 (2.42)

.08

(6.68)

.06

(5.08)

T-statistics are in parentheses next to the coefficients and elasticities are in parentheses beneath the coefficients.

Table

4

Coeffic ients of Variatio n and Correla tion Coeffic ients
for Wages and Labor Supply

Coeffic ients of Variatio n

Period One

Period Two

Husband 's Wage

.216

.186

Wife's Wage

.236

.186

Sum of Wages

.213

.175

Husband 's Labor Supply

.206

·.153

Wife's Labor Supply

.726

.869

Husband 's and Wife's Wage

.so

.74

Husband 's and Wife's Labor Supply

.os

.04

Correla tion Coeffic ients

Table B-1
Linear Regressio n Results for the Probabili ty of
Observing Wages

Intercept
Education
(Educatio n)

2

Men

Period

Women
Period
One

Two

Period

-29.2

(17. 5)

(3.8)

-0.73

.030

(2.1)

.0013

(1.9)

-7.0

.043 (11.1)

Education * Year Born
Year Born
(Year Born) 2 /100

2
R {F)

a

.0425 (3.8)

-.002

(3.4)

-.0016 ('.l. 3)

-.004

(6.9)

(3.6)

-.14

(3.2)

-1.36

(18.4)

-0.26

{3.3)

0.86

(7. 3)

-.106

(9.4)

.40

(182)

{5.0)

-.17

{4.7)

.25

(306)

.05

(60.1)

4,222

(2.2)

0.48

(7.6)

0.28

-.15

Period Two

.215

(18.0)

4,582

n

Notes:

a

(1. 2)

1.27

(Year Born) 3 /1000
Socioeconomic Status

One

1,624

.004

(0.4)

-.0005 (O.O)

.02

(6.9)

1,624

Socioeconomic status is an index of the status of the parental family of the
women in the sample. It is not available for the men.

Table B-2
Linear Regression Results for Wages with and
Without Selectivity Bias Correction

Women
Period Two

Period One
Intercept

(2. 5)

-8.4

(0.7)

3.6

(0.9)

.19 (14 .. 7)

-.15

(7 .0)

-.15

(7 .0)

(1.6)

18.3

-3.8

.20

(14.8)

-.13

(1.0)

-1.25

(2. 6)

.39

(2. 5)

.64

(3. 3)

(Year born) 2

.07

(0.5)

1.25

(2. 5)

-.46

(2.9)

-.71

(3. 6)

Education

.12

(20.2)

.08

(4.0)

.16

(23.0)

.19

(10.9)

D-Nonwhite

-.08

(3.3)

-.10

(3.9)

.02

(0.7)

.OS

(1. 5)

D-South

-.25

(11.0)

-.26 (11. 2)

-.30

(9.7)

-.29

(9. 2)

D-SM~A

.21

(8.7)

.21

(9.0)

.23

(7.3)

.21

(6.9)

.87

(2.4)

-.93

(2.0)

.40

(205)

.34

(153)

Year Wage Measured
Year Born

Selectivity Correction
R2 (F)

.40

(233)

2,334

2,334

2,447

2,447

n

(174)

.34

Men
Period Two

Period One
(0.2)

-0.8

(O. 7)

-3.6

-4.0

(0.7)

Intercept

8.1

(2.1)

Year Wage Measu ied

-.07

(1.1)

.OS

(0.8)

.03

(0.5)

.03

(0.4)

Year Born

-.06

(6.8)

-.03

(3.3)

.23

(4.5)

.24

(4. 7)

-.38

(6.3)

-.37

(6. 3)

.14 (10.3)

.15

(9.0)

(Year Born) 2
.14

(10.8)

· .15

(11.2)

D-Nonwhite

-.37

(4.0)

-.37

(4.0)

-.40

(4.4)

-.40

(4.4)

D-South

-.44

(5.8)

-.44

(5. 9)

-.44

(5.9)

-.44

(6.0)

.53

(7.0)

.51

(6.8)

.44

(6.0)

.44

(6.0)

1.04

(4.3)

-1.79

(1.1)

.27

(62)

.26

(62)

F.ducation

D-SMSA
Selectivity Correction
2
R (F)

n

.26

(68)

1,157

1,157

.26

(71)

1,424

1,424

